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“The existing village system has the effect of making the Scheduled Castes in the village slaves of the caste Hindus . 
. . Under the village system the Scheduled Castes are not allowed to live inside the village. They have to live on the 
outskirts . . . They have no independent means of livelihood. They own no land . . . They have to do forced labour 
day in and day out on pain of being driven away from their quarters by the Hindu landlords . . . They have to live a 
life of degradation, dishonour and ignominy from generation to generation. It is a state of eternal perdition.” 
Dr Ambedkar’s comment in the Constituent Assembly in 1947 on the ‘Status of the Untouchable Castes in the 
Indian Village’. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Discrimination may be pithily described as the “unequal treatment of equals".  More accurately, 
it represents a situation wherein individuals are treated and judged—for better or for worse—in terms 
of their membership of a group rather than in terms of their individual personal qualities.  This begs the 
question as to why discrimination occurs at all. How might it be modelled? How might it be measured? 
All these questions are addressed in this paper. 
 However, even before broaching such questions, we need to explore the prior question of why 
we—along with a large number of academics, journalists, and policy-makers—should be concerned with 
the issue of discrimination at all? What does it matter if a group of individuals is discriminated against?  
What harm does discrimination inflict? On the person concerned? On society at large?  
The short answer is that discrimination fosters social exclusion. The term ‘social exclusion’, 
which means the process by which certain groups are unable to fully participate in the lives of their 
communities, which has concomitant consequences—has, since its origins in the writings of René Lenoir 
(1974), spawned a vast and eclectic body of literature, as the list of things that people might be excluded 
from has mushroomed. Silver (1995), for example, itemises some of these factors: inter alia livelihood; 
secure, permanent employment; earnings; property; credit; land; housing; education, skills, and cultural 
capital; the welfare State.  The basis on which people are excluded also comprises a long list (see DFID, 
2005): age, caste, gender, disability, ethnic background, HIV status, migrant status, religion, sexual 
orientation. Such an uncontrolled proliferation of items has invited inevitable criticism from some 
experts in poverty and development, epitomised by Oysen's (1997) dismissal of social 
integration/exclusion as "an umbrella concept for which there is limited theoretical underpinning". 
 More recently, Sen (2000) attempted to inject some rigour into the concept of social exclusion. 
He began by observing that, in the tradition initiated by Aristotle, and continued by Adam Smith (1776), 
poverty should properly be viewed in terms of ‘poor living’ rather than simply ‘low income’. From the 
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former perspective, poverty is a multi-dimensional concept, embracing the following characteristics: low 
income; bad, or no, employment; illiteracy or, at best, low levels of education; poor health and access to 
healthcare; and most generally, difficulty experienced in taking part in the life of the community.1 
 Against this backdrop of a multi-dimensional view of poverty, Sen (2000) argued that the 
function of the concept of social exclusion was not to widen or otherwise alter our concept of poverty 
but, rather, to highlight the relational aspects and processes which underpin poverty.  Thus, the 
following critical issues need to be addressed before any judgement can be passed on the usefulness of 
social exclusion as a concept: (i) Does it contribute to our understanding of the nature and causes of 
poverty? (ii) Would our understanding be different if this concept did not exist? (iii) Does it enrich 
thinking about policies to alleviate poverty?  
 While answering this set of questions, Sen (2000) drew our attention to two features of social 
exclusion. The first is that exclusion is a relational concept referring to the lack of affinity between an 
individual and the wider community. Second, when the relation between social exclusion and poverty is 
being defined, a fundamental distinction needs to be made between exclusion being constitutively a 
part of deprivation and that being instrumental in causing deprivation. In its ‘constitutive’ interpretation, 
exclusion from some (or all) aspects of social functioning in itself, and of itself, constitutes an important 
aspect of deprivation. In the ‘instrumental’ interpretation, exclusion per se does not constitute 
deprivation but it is a cause of deprivation. 
 Some types of exclusion may form a constitutive part of deprivation but may not necessarily be 
instrumental in causing deprivation. For example, the denial of access to the village well to some 
families would not have consequences for them with respect to the water supply if these families had 
mains water supplied to their homes; however, being denied access itself might constitute deprivation 
as it is tantamount to robbing such families of a sense of ‘belonging’ to the village.2 Conversely, other 
types of exclusion may not form a constitutive part of deprivation but might nevertheless be 
instrumental in causing deprivation: a denial of credit might not be shameful per se but might lead to 
deprivation through an inability to pursue business opportunities. More generally, social exclusion might 
have both constitutive and instrumental importance for deprivation. 
                                                          
1
 Or, as Adam Smith put it, ‘an inability to appear in public without shame’. 
2
 In another example, with the social status attached to being an owner-occupier in the UK and the USA, a lack of 
access to the mortgage market might involve enforced living in rented accommodation and consequently 
engender a ‘feeling of shame’. However, if the quality of the owned and rented accommodation is not very 
different from owned accommodation, no further deprivation (in terms of low-quality housing) would follow. 
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 A major instrument of social exclusion is discriminatory behaviour, whereby certain persons are 
excluded from important activities by virtue of their belonging to certain groups which, for whatever 
reason are regarded ‘unfavourably’. In practical terms, discrimination may assume many forms and 
encompass several areas of life. In the Indian context, Thorat and Sabharwal (2009a and 2009b) detail 
many of the ways through which Dalits are discriminated against. In the context of the rural labour 
market, discrimination assumes the form of denial of work, as agricultural workers (reported in 36 per 
cent of the villages), ensuring that no touching takes place while paying wages (in 37 per cent of the 
villages), payment of lower wages for the same work (in 25 per cent of the villages), refusal to employ 
Dalit workers in house building (in 29 per cent of the villages); denial of access to irrigation facilities (in 
33 per cent of the villages); and denial of access to grazing/fishing grounds (in 21 per cent of the 
villages). In this context, the purpose of this paper is to review the issues of discriminatory behaviour 
through an understanding of its theoretical underpinnings and by means of a critical appreciation of the 
different methods used to measure discrimination. 
 
 
2. CONCEPTS OF DISCRIMINATION 
 Irrespective of whatever forms discrimination takes, its central form is the act of making a 
distinction between persons categorically rather than individually. This means that any difference in the 
treatment between persons is based on their group membership rather than on their relevant personal 
characteristics. Therefore, such difference in treatment constitutes discriminatory behaviour. This is the 
conventional definition of discrimination, which has also been adopted in this paper. 
 
2.1 Legal View of Discrimination 
Under the law, discrimination has the following two aspects: 
1. The first relates to the identification of the groups, which are to be ‘protected’ against unequal 
treatment. The unequal treatment of equals amounts to ‘discrimination’ only if the aggrieved 
party belongs to a ‘protected’ group, gender, race, caste and religion. Otherwise, it is not 
considered discrimination. 
2. The second relates to the issue of what constitutes unequal treatment. Here, we have to 
distinguish between disparate treatment and disparate impact. A particular action may amount 
to treating persons from different groups differently (disparate treatment) or it may amount to 
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treating them equally but may have a disparate impact on people from different groups. A 
related question is business necessity: is an organisation’s action, which is allegedly 
discriminatory, essential for its functioning or is it of no relevance? In legal terms, a particular 
treatment qualifies as discrimination if it involves the following: 
a. Disparate treatment of persons in protected groups, regardless of whether or not there is a 
business necessity; and 
b. Adverse impact on persons in protected groups without business necessity. 
2.2 Economists’ View of Discrimination 
The economists follow the lead of Becker (1971) when they define discrimination. According to him, 
“discrimination in the market place consists of voluntarily relinquishing profits in order to cater to 
prejudice.” Defined in this sense, discrimination becomes the ‘price’ of prejudice. It is the price paid by 
those who indulge in their ‘taste for discrimination’ in terms of foregone profits.  Some examples of the 
‘price of prejudice’ are as follows: 
1. A less qualified White person is chosen for a job over a more qualified Black person, as a result 
of which the employer forgoes the prospective higher profit that would accrue from employing 
the more qualified Black person. 
2. A house owner rents his property at a lower rent to a White tenant in preference to a Black 
tenant who would pay a higher rent.  
3. A bank gives loan to a less credit-worthy White customer but turns down a more credit-worthy 
Black person with the result that, as compared to the Black customer, the bank is prepared to 
accept a higher risk of default from the White customer.    
If we accept Becker’s view of discrimination as forgoing profits to satisfy a ‘taste for prejudice’, then 
one of the consequences of discrimination is that a better qualified Black applicant would be turned 
down in favour of a less qualified White applicant. Thus, the successful Black applicants, on an average, 
are ‘better’ than successful White applicants because they have had to meet a higher standard of 
compliance. 
The implication of this situation is that if discriminatory practice prevails in markets, then inter alia: 
1. The Black employees would be more productive than the White employees; 
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2. The Black tenants would pay a higher rent than the White tenants; and 
3. The Black borrowers would exhibit a lower rate of default in repaying loans than the White 
borrowers. 
If we do not observe these differences in outcomes between the groups, then there cannot be any 
discrimination in that market. This means that the decision-making agent is accepting the same standard 
of compliance (in terms of qualifications, rent, and credit risk) from the Black and the White employees.  
2.3 Statistical Discrimination 
Statistical or belief-based discrimination arises when prior belief (or knowledge) about the 
characteristics of the group to which an individual belongs is used to make inferences about the 
individual’s characteristics (see Arrow, 1972a; 1972b; 1973; Phelps, 1972; Lundberg and Startz, 2007). 
1. For example, if it is an employer’s belief that on an average, the Black employees are less 
punctual than the White employees, she/he may take this fact into account when choosing 
between a Black and a White job applicant. 
2. If it is a landlord’s’ belief that the average Black tenant is more troublesome than the average 
White tenant, she/he may take this fact into account when choosing between a Black and a 
White tenant. 
3.  If it is a bank manager’s belief that the average default rates are higher for the Black as 
compared to the White borrowers, she/he may take this fact into account when choosing 
between a Black and a White applicant for loan. 
 
Beliefs can also reflect prejudice through the propagation of negative stereotypes of certain groups. 
Under a negative stereotype, a prior negative belief about a group’s average value of some relevant 
characteristic is used to assess the ability of all individuals who belong to this group. Therefore, the fact 
that on an average, a group scores poorly in a test is used to conclude that every member of that group 
would score poorly in that test or, more accurately, the likelihood of a member of that group scoring 
poorly is greater than the corresponding likelihood for a person who belongs to a group that has a 
higher average score.   
Negative stereotypes about groups constitute a different type of prejudice from Becker’s distaste for 
all individuals who belong to a certain group, regardless of their or their group’s ‘quality’. Under this 
proposition, assessment is done only with respect to the relevant task and does not imply any further 
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prejudice against the group. Thus, belief-based discrimination is a market-based explanation for 
discrimination, which does not require a taste for discrimination. Also, unlike taste-based discrimination, 
it does not require a sacrifice of profits. Indeed, if the prior belief is true, profits are expected to go up as 
a result of discrimination. 
Belief-based discrimination about the average performance of a group penalises talented individuals 
from that group by ascribing to them the average quality of their group. Consequently, such 
discrimination can change the behaviour of a group. If the employer judges by means of a negative 
group stereotype, then there is no point in making human capital investments (relating to education, 
study, diligence, work habits, attitudes to work) since they will carry low (if not zero) rates of return. This 
argument is evident in the words of Elmslie and Sedo (1996,p. 474):“One initial bout of unemployment 
that is not productivity based can lay the foundation for continued future unemployment and 
persistently lower job status even if no future discrimination occurs.” 
More recently, social scientists have expressed interest in a phenomenon referred to as the‘ 
stereotype threat’. This threat is characterised by persistent discrimination which reduces the 
confidence of the victims and undermines their self-esteem as they begin to believe in their low worth 
as individuals. This is what Bertrand, et al. (2005) call ‘implicit discrimination’. In the context of 
experimental economics, Hoff and Pandey (2006) conducted an experiment in North India wherein 
children were asked to solve problems. When the children’s castes were not revealed to the other 
participants, the performance by low-caste children was found to be not very different from that of the 
higher-caste children. Yet, when the castes were publicly announced, the performance by lower-caste 
children significantly dropped. This suggests that a loss of self-confidence may have played a role in the 
decline of their performance. 
The view that statistical discrimination based on negative stereotypes can discourage the motivation 
to equip oneself for advancement is also consistent with evidence from India. For example, Jeffery and 
Jeffery (1997), in their study of the Muslims in Bijnor, argued that many Muslims believed that their 
relative economic weakness stems from their being excluded from jobs due to the prevalence of 
discriminatory practices in hiring. The belief that their sons would not get jobs then led the Muslim 
parents to devalue the importance of education as an instrument of upward economic mobility. It was 
with these considerations in mind that Myrdal (1944) spoke of the ‘vicious circles of cumulative 
causation’. The failure of the discriminated groups to make progress justifies the prejudicial attitudes of 
the dominant groups. 
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3. THE PERSISTENCE OF DISCRIMINATION  
The market-based theories of discrimination are unable to explain the persistence of discrimination. 
Taste-based discrimination cannot explain why arbitrage does not eliminate discrimination: employers 
without discriminatory tastes can have higher profits than those with discriminatory tastes by simply 
hiring high-productivity labour from the group that is discriminated against. Belief-based discrimination 
cannot explain why through a Bayesian updating process, posterior experience does not erode prior 
beliefs and eliminate such discrimination. In order to explain persistence, it is necessary to turn to non-
market reasons for discrimination. Market discrimination views discrimination as the result of an 
impersonal relation between market participants, whereas non-market discrimination emphasises the 
social nature of transactions. 
One form of non-market discrimination concerns the role of friends and acquaintances in 
securing a ‘favourable outcome’, such as a job, a loan, a tenant, or admission into an educational 
institution or hospital, among other things. This signifies the network concept of allocation. Under this 
concept, who you know determines the chance of a ‘favourable outcome’ (see Granovetter, 1995; 
White, 1995).If one applies this to discrimination, ‘who you know’ (that is, the density of one’s network) 
depends critically on one’s group identity. A strong group identity leads to social segregation, while 
social segregation leads to segregation in economic outcomes. If the groups differ in terms of social and 
economic strengths, then they differ in terms of their network density, and hence in terms of their 
chance of a ‘favourable outcome’. The main point of this argument is that personal interactions occur 
throughout the search process and that these are as important, if not more, than impersonal market 
relationships. Discrimination offers social rewards to the discriminator, the returns for which can be 
realised in some later reciprocal transaction. 
Another reason for the persistence of discriminatory behaviour is the stigma attached to the 
‘victim’ group. The key concept here is the virtual social identity based on easily identifiable markings (of 
race, gender and caste). The identity is ‘virtual’ because it can differ from a person’s actual identity, and 
it is ‘social’ because the imputation occurs within a social context. This virtual identity may differ from 
the person’s actual identity, which is based on his personal characteristics. Stigma occurs when the 
imputed virtual identity is dishonourable, that is, persons who belong to a particular group are seen as 
being ‘flawed’ or ‘damaged’. Stigmatisation implies more than doubting a person’s productivity, for it 
signifies doubting of a person’s humanity by regarding her/him as a lesser human being than others. 
The origins of stigmatisation often lie in a history of dishonour. The stigmatisation of the Blacks 
in the USA, for instance, has its origins in slavery, which represented the violent domination of ‘natally 
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inferior’ persons. Therefore, under this scenario, emancipation through legislation is not enough to 
overcome the burden of history (see Loury, 2002; Goffman, 1959; Patterson, 1982).Similarly, in the 
Indian traditional caste system, the untouchables, who are placed at the bottom of the caste hierarchy, 
suffered from the notion of ‘untouchability’, which is unique to their caste (the other lower castes do 
not suffer from untouchability). Due to this stigma of untouchability, the untouchables are believed to 
be impure and polluting. Hence, they are considered unfit for social association and inter-relation with 
the castes above them. Such practices have led to their physical and social segregation and isolation. 
This, in turn, has led them to face denial of various faculties: of freedom; equal opportunities; and of 
equal civil, social, cultural, religious and economic rights. This has further resulted in denial of equal 
access to them in various spheres of society, culture and the economy. Thus, their lack of participation in 
the communal life of the society, which resulted from the original notion of untouchability, is far more 
comprehensive and widespread insofar as it entails restrictions on their physical and social mobility, 
which assumes various forms and dimensions (Thorat and Sabharwal, 2010). 
 
4. The Identity-based Theory of Discrimination   
Akerlof and Kranton (2010) argue that the existing theories of discrimination (propagated by 
Becker, 1971; and Arrow, 1972a; 1972b) cannot help us understand why discrimination is so persistent. 
They developed an identity-based theory of discrimination and, thereby, brought the influence of the 
social context into economic decisions made by the individuals. The social categories and norms 
constitute the identity. “People’s identity defines who they are—their social category and different 
norms for behaviour are associated with different social categories. Individual pecuniary and non-
pecuniary motivation, and tests and preferences are influenced by the social context and norms. Insofar 
as the Identity theory brings the social context (that is who they are) and norms (and how should they 
behave or relate with others) into the realm of economic decision-making by individuals, this has 
changed the traditional presumption of economists that tests and preferences are individual 
characteristics, independent of the social context. The identity theory proposed by Akerlof and Kranton 
maintained that within social categories, there are norms regarding how someone belonging to those 
social categories should behave, and that these norms affect behaviour. This theory has three main 
elements as propounded by its promoters below: 
“First it associates individuals with a particular social category or identity. Second it specifies the 
prevailing norms and ideals for these categories. And finally it posits individual gains and losses from 
different decisions, given identities and corresponding norms. It maintains that identity utility which is 
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the gain when action conforms to norms and ideals, and loss insofar as they do not .These gains and 
losses, combined with the standard concerns of economic analysis, will then determine what people do. 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2010, pp. 13-20). 
In its application to race and poverty, the identity theory explains racial discrimination in terms 
of what authors call “’oppositional Identity”. The behaviour of Whites towards Blacks is determined by 
different codes or norms, which, in turn, perpetuate a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Thus, White 
Americans think of Black Americans as ‘them’ rather than as ‘us’ (p. 100).  Oppositional identity results 
in discrimination, which, in turn, explains the poverty of Blacks through a theory of identity, 
discrimination and Black poverty. 
The role of social identity in shaping outcomes in the spheres of work and education has also 
been extensively discussed by Akerlof and Kranton (2010). They argue that the traditional economic 
model in which students, as rational decision-makers, weighed the economic costs and benefits of 
schooling, was flawed because it did not take into account the constraints imposed by the social 
identities of the children. Using examples from the USA, they show that the social burden of being Black 
or Hispanic led many children from such groups to under-perform relative to their White peers even 
within the same school. Consequently, relative to social pressures, the economic returns to education in 
terms of more pleasant and better-paid jobs could be a weak determinant of the children’s efforts at 
school. The solution for such ‘identity-based’ problems lies in viewing schools as platforms not just for 
imparting skills but also for teaching norms of behaviour, and, that by doing so, they become a 
sanctuary from the dysfunctional world outside their walls. 
 
5. DETECTION OF DISCRIMINATION  
There are two main ways of detecting the existence of discrimination—regression analysis and audit 
studies. These are discussed in detail below. 
 
5.1 Regression Analysis 
In regression analysis, the dependent variable is usually the outcome for persons and the regression 
equation is ‘controlled’ by a number of personal characteristic variables that are unrelated to group 
membership, plus a group membership variable. If the coefficient group on the group variable is 
significant after controlling for the other non-group variables, discrimination is said to exist.  
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However, the regression analysis has some pitfalls that are mainly connected with the equation 
specification. These are as follows: 
1. If the equation is under-specified (that is, the relevant variables are omitted), the extent of 
discrimination would be over-stated. 
2. If the equation is over-specified (that is, the irrelevant variables are included), the extent of 
discrimination would be over-stated. 
3. It is only if one is certain that the equation is exactly specified (which one can never be) that one 
can be sure that discrimination has been correctly identified and measured. 
In the regression-based method, a single regression was estimated over all persons regardless of the 
group to which they belonged. The implicit assumption was that all persons (say, Black or White) faced 
the same regression coefficients in the evaluation of their attributes and the only coefficient that 
distinguished the Blacks and the Whites from each other was that of the race variable. This assumption 
is relaxed by estimating separate equations between the two groups and allowing the existence of 
different coefficients between them. This raises the following questions. 
When we observe a difference in the mean achievement between Whites and Blacks, what is it 
due to? 
1. Is it the result of the superior attributes of the Whites as manifested in relatively more 
favourable values of the explanatory variables for the Whites as compared to the Blacks? 
2. Or, is it due to the superior treatment of the Whites as manifested in relatively more favourable 
coefficients for the Whites as compared to the Blacks? 
3. Or, is it due to some combination of superior attributes and favourable treatment, and if so, can 
we quantify how much is due to the former and how much to the latter?  
Decomposition analysis allows us to answer Question 3 above, that is, to say how much of the 
overall difference in outcomes between the Whites and the Blacks is due to Question 1 and how much is 
due to Question 2. 
 
5.2 How Decomposition Works 
The problem with the detection of discrimination is that Blacks and Whites differ from each other in 
terms of both attributes and coefficients. Thus, the first step is to ask what the Black–White difference 
would have been if both sets of attributes were evaluated at a common coefficient vector. This 
difference could then be entirely ascribed to the difference in attributes since coefficient differences 
would have been neutralised. We call this the ‘difference due to attributes’. 
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The ‘observed’ difference, which is less than the ‘difference due to attributes’, is the ‘residual’ or 
‘unexplained’ difference. It is this residual difference that can be interpreted as resulting from 
discrimination, subject, however, to several caveats set out below (see Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). 
A recent formal exposition of the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition method (named after Blinder, 
1973, and Oaxaca, 1973) for linear regression models is to be found in Jann (2008). Suppose there are 
two groups, W and B, with Y as an outcome variable such that E(YW) and E(YB) are the expected values of 
the outcome variable for groups W and B, respectively, then, 
 ' , ,k W B  Y X β εk k k k  (1) 
where, Yk is the vector of outcomes, Xk is the matrix of observations, and k is the vector of error terms 
for persons in group k.  
Since, by assumption E(k) = 0, we have: ( ) ( )  and ( ) ( )W W W B B BE Y E X E Y E X     which implies: 
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       
      
  
 (2) 
As Jann (2008) points out: the term ( )W B BP E X X   in Equation (2), mentioned above, 
amounts to the difference in mean outcomes, that is due to the inter-group differences in the predictors 
(the attributes effect); the term ( )( )B W BQ E X    in Equation (2), mentioned above, amounts to the 
difference in mean outcomes, that is due to the inter-group differences in the coefficients (the 
coefficients effect); the term, ( ) ( )W B W BR E X X      amounts to the difference in mean outcomes, 
that is due to an interaction term representing the fact that the differences in attributes and coefficients 
exist simultaneously between the two groups. 
 The decomposition represented in Equation (2) is formulated from the perspective of Group B 
because the inter-group difference in predictors is weighed by the coefficients of Group B to determine 
the attributes effect, P. The P component measures the expected change in Group B’s mean outcome if 
it had Group W’s attributes. Similarly, the Q component measures the expected change in Group B’s 
mean outcome if Group B had Group W’s coefficients.  
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 Needless to say, the decomposition in Equation (2) can also be represented from the 
perspective of Group W as follows: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )W B W A W B W B W BE X X E X E X X P Q R                  (3) 
Now the endowment effect P measures the expected change in Group A’s mean outcome, if it had 
Group B’s attributes and the Q component measures the expected change in Group W’s mean 
outcome, if Group W had Group B’s coefficients. 
 As Jann (2008) points out, an alternative decomposition to Equations (2) and (3) is to assume 
that there is some non-discriminatory coefficient vector, *, which should be used to evaluate the 
contribution of the difference in attributes. Then the outcome difference can be written as follows: 
 
* * * *
* * *
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
W B W W B B
W W B B W W B B
W B W W B B
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 
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    
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          
       
 
 
 (4) 
Equation (4) yields a twofold decomposition in which the term *( )W BU E X X    is the part 
of the outcome difference that can be explained by the difference in attributes, and the term 
* *( )( ) ( )( )W W B BV E X E X        is the unexplained part. The latter is usually ascribed to 
discrimination. 
There are two possible variations of Equation (4). First, suppose *
W  , that is, the non-
discriminatory coefficient vector is identified as that associated with Group W. Then Equation (4) 
becomes: 
 ( ) ( )( )W B W B W BR E X X E X       (5) 
Second and alternatively, suppose *
B  , that is, the non-discriminatory coefficient vector is 
identified as that associated with Group B. Then Equation (4) becomes: 
 ( ) ( )( )W B B A W BR E X X E X       (6) 
 In Equation (5), the difference in attributes between groups Wand B is evaluated at the Group 
W’s coefficients. In Equation (6), the difference in attributes between Groups W and B is evaluated at 
the Group B’s coefficients. 
 In general, the problem of defining *, the non-discriminatory coefficient vector, is a major issue 
in the decomposition literature on discrimination. One possibility [as in Equations (5) and (6) mentioned 
above] is to identify * with the coefficients of one of the groups. Another possibility is to regard it as 
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the average of the two group coefficients (Reimers, 1983): * 0.5 0.5W B      .  Yet another (Cotton, 
1988) is to weight the coefficients by the size of the groups: *
W W B Bn n      where nW and nB are 
the proportions in Groups Wand B. 
 The analysis of decomposition in linear models can also be extended to non-linear models when 
a favourable outcome either occurs or does not occur (Borooah and Iyer, 2005). Suppose there are N 
persons (indexed, i = 1 . . . N) who can be placed in K mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
groups, k = 1 . . . K, with each group containing Nk persons. Then, define the variable ENRi such that ENRi 
= 1, if the favourable outcome occurs; and ENRi = 0, if it does not. Then, under a logit model, the 
likelihood of a favourable outcome for a person from Group k is as follows:  
 
exp( ) ˆPr( 1) ( )
1 exp( )
iENR F  

k k
k ki
ik k
i
X β
X β
X β
 (7) 
where,  
 , 1...ijX j J kiX represents the vector of observations for person i of Group k, on J variables which 
determine the likelihood of the favourable outcome. 
ˆ , 1...kj j J kβ is the associated vector of coefficient estimates for persons who belong to Group k.   
The average probability of a favourable outcome for a person from Group k is: 
 1
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
kN
k
k
i
ENR P N F

  k k k ki iX ,β X β  (8) 
Now for any two groups, say, the Hindu (k = H) and the Muslim (k = M):   
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]H MENR ENR P P P P    M H M M H H M Hi i i iX ,β X ,β X ,β X ,β (9) 
Alternatively: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]H MENR ENR P P P P    H H H M H M M Mi i i iX ,β X ,β X ,β X ,β (10) 
The first term in the square brackets in Equations (9) and (10) represents the ‘response effect’. It 
is the difference in the average favourable outcome rates between the Hindus and the Muslims that 
result from inter-community differences in their responses (as exemplified by differences in the 
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coefficient vectors) to a given vector of attribute values. The second term in the square brackets in 
Equations (9) and (10) represents the ‘attributes effect’. This signifies the difference in the average 
favourable outcome rates between the Hindus and the Muslims that result from inter-community 
differences in attributes when these attributes are evaluated by using a common coefficient vector.  
For example, in Equation (9), the difference in the sample means is decomposed by asking what 
the average favourable outcome rates for the Muslims would have been had they been treated in the 
same manner as the Hindus. In Equation (10), it is decomposed by asking what the average favourable 
outcome rates for the Hindus would have been had they been treated in the same manner as the 
Muslims. In other words, the common coefficient vector used to compute the attribute effect is, for 
Equation (9), the Hindu vector; and for Equation (10), the Muslim vector. 
5.3. Audit Studies 
An audit is a matched-pair survey technique that allows researchers to observe how economic agents 
behave. In an audit study, two equally matched candidates from different groups are sent to accomplish 
a particular task with respect to a sample of agents, whose behaviour towards the candidates is then 
observed. 
The audit studies avoid many of the pitfalls of regression analysis by equalising many essential 
characteristics between the candidates. However, they pose their own problems, which can be are 
delineated as follows (see Yinger, 1998; and Heckman, 1998): 
1. There are challenges of both design and management. The unobserved variables signify that all 
the relevant variables would will not be matched (see Heckman and Siegelman, 1993).The audit 
refers to a particular stage of the transaction and not to the entire transaction (see Yinger, 
1998).It refers to the sample of firms and not to the entire market (see Heckman, 1998). 
2. There are problems in interpreting the results in the context of measuring discrimination.     
The majority of the audit studies use one of two measures (see Wienk, et al., 1979).These are: 
1. The gross incidence of unfavourable treatment, which is the share of the audits in which the 
protected group is treated less favourably. 
2. The net incidence of unfavourable treatment, which is the share of the audits in which the 
protected group is treated less favourably, and less the share of audits in which the protected 
group is treated more favourably.  
The problem is that the gross and net measures can be far apart. Also, there are problems 
regarding the net measure as being lower-bound. Lastly, there is the problem of interpreting the net 
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measure. The net measure shows that protected group members are more likely to encounter 
unfavourable treatment than members from the dominant group. However, that is not the same as 
discrimination (see Yinger, 1998).In many cases, audit studies show symmetrical treatments, that is, 
either both are successful or both are unsuccessful. Thus, it is difficult to know how to interpret the 
small differences in preferences. 
6. MODELLING DISCRIMINATION 
The model in this section is adapted from Longhofer and Peters (1998). Suppose that the set of 
candidates who are looking for a ‘favourable outcome’ (that is, a job, a loan, or a house to rent) is 
represented by, where this set can be divided into two mutually exclusive sub-sets: the set of Black 
candidates (B) and the set of White candidates (W). Suppose that [0,1] is a measure of candidate 
‘quality’ and f() is the density function of  across  with the cumulative density function. Then, 
 
0
( ) Pr( ) ( )
z
F z z f d       (11) 
Where * is the threshold level of quality such that the candidate is awarded the outcome if and only if 
*.  Unfortunately,  is unobservable and is proxied by an observable signal , where g(|) is the 
conditional density of . If w(, ) is the joint density of  and , then, applying Bayes’ Theorem, the 
unconditional density of  is:  
 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )h w d g f d       
 
    (12) 
Let v(|) be the conditional density of  where (again by Bayes’ Theorem): 
 
( , ) ( | ) ( )
( | )
( ) ( )
w g f
v
h h
    
 
 
   (13) 
 
Then, v(|) is the posterior density of  and this is arrived at through a Bayesian updating of the prior 
density f(). Then the expected value of , for a person who emits a signal , is:  
 
( | ) ( )ˆ( | ) ( ) ( | )
( )
g f
E v d d
h
  
         

 
 
    
 
   (14) 
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The agent then decides to bestow the favourable outcome if *ˆ( )   .  
It is important to stress that the agent is not concerned with the value of per se but with what this 
value implies for the candidate’s expected quality, ˆ( )  . 
Two assumptions are crucial to the model. They are: 
1. 
ˆ( )
0
 




 
2. The inverse function: ˆ( )    exists. 
In Figure 1, the Blacks are held to a greater threshold standard of compliance (higher) and have to send 
a stronger threshold signal (higher).This is Becker’s model, in which the underlying assumption is that 
the density f() is the same for the Blacks and the Whites but it is the Blacks who are discriminated 
against. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Beckerian Discrimination  
(Source: Longhofer and Peters, 1998) 
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In the belief-based model as shown in Figure 2, the agents are neutral in their preferences between the 
Blacks and the Whites; but they believe that f
B
() and f
W
() are different so that the average quality is 
lower for the Blacks than for the Whites. In other words, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
B W
B B W WE f d f d E       
 
     
Therefore, if the same signal were applied to the White and the Black applicants, it could yield a lower 
expected quality for the Blacks than for the Whites: 
 ˆ ˆ( | ) ( ) ( ) ( | )B B W WE E           
In Figure 2, the Blacks and the Whites are on the same compliance standard (*) but have to send 
different signals to meet this standard. The Blacks have to send a stronger signal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Statistical Discrimination 
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(Source: Longhofer and Peters, 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY DIRECTIONS 
There are two different sets of policies—Equal Opportunities (EO) and Affirmative Action (AA)— 
in reducing discriminatory bias in hiring. The model developed in the previous section pointed to the 
fact that a candidate has an underlying, unobservable ‘quality’, denoted by .The greater the value of  , 
the ‘better’ is the candidate. The candidate sends out a signal, s, where s is a N-component vector: s = 
(s
1
….s
N
) and s is used to obtain an estimate of : *=g(s).  The quality of * as an estimate of would 
depend upon the correlation between * and . In turn, this correlation would depend upon the 
components of the vector s.  
The presence of ‘irrelevant’ components would corrupt the overall signal and weaken the 
correlation between * and . However, the presence of ‘irrelevant’ signal components is not a matter 
of chance: it reflects discriminatory bias, which is also manifested in, say, questions like: What is your 

*
 

B
*
 W
*
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father’s profession? Do you expect to have more children? Who will look after your children while you 
are at work?  These questions reflect a bias against particular groups of persons.  
 A major role of EO policies is to weed out such irrelevant and/or discriminatory components by 
making it illegal to ask such questions. The entire signal-extraction process is tightly regulated, made 
transparent, and placed in the public domain. There is a tightly specified procedure for recruitment, 
ranging from the advertisement to the interview to the appointment of the candidate, with a written 
record maintained at each stage. Unsuccessful candidates have the right to appeal against ‘unfair 
treatment’. Not only do EO policies attempt to eliminate discriminatory bias by making it illegal, but EO 
also builds non-discriminatory policies into the fabric of the human resource management of 
organisations by carrying out audits of organisations about their EO outcomes. However, it needs to be 
emphasised that EO does not imply affirmative action because it does not impose quotas or require 
preferential treatment. 
 In contrast to EO, AA is concerned with outcomes, not processes. Thus organisations are asked 
to ‘explain’ if their employment proportions of ‘protected’ groups differ significantly from the 
population proportions. In the absence of a convincing explanation, the difference is presumed to be 
due to bias. For example, under the US Civil Rights Act of 1991, any employment practice having a 
‘disparate impact’ upon women or minorities is unlawful unless it is predicated by ‘business necessity’. 
The most common way of escaping sanctions under this Act is by having informal quotas in hiring.3 
 The argument in favour of AA is that if there were a pre-legislative bias in hiring, then, prior to 
legislation, the groups discriminated against would lack the incentive to acquire skills. Hence, AA, by 
removing this bias, gives these groups the incentive to skill themselves. Furthermore, AA policies 
provide protected groups a foot on the bottom rung of the ladder. The confidence that this instils 
creates incentives to acquire the skills to climb the rest of the ladder unaided. 
 Sowell (2004) observes that while AA policies exist in several countries of the world, in 
practically every country, they are justified as representing a situation that is unique to that particular 
country: inter alia, the special situation of Maoris in New Zealand, of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) in India, and of Blacks in the USA. Another feature of AA programmes across the 
world is that they are purely temporary—as soon the inequality which they address has been righted, 
these policies would be dismantled.  
                                                          
3
 Of course, one can also escape sanctions by showing ‘business necessity’ or by showing an absence of the 
‘disparate effect’, the latter most usually by appealing to the skills distribution of the relevant groups. 
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The third feature of AA policies is that the distinction between the protected and non-protected 
groups leads to perverse incentives as some members of the non-protected groups seek re-designation 
as members of the protected groups. In India, for instance, Gujjars have, in the state of Rajasthan, 
sought to be re-classified as members of the STs from their current classification as Other Backward 
Classes (OBC). As part of the OBC group, Gujjars have to compete for jobs and preference with strong 
well-established groups like the Meenas and the Jats while, as part of the STs, they would be competing 
with considerably weaker groups. In the USA, several persons have claimed or tried to claim that they 
were American Indians while, in Australia, there has been a rush to claim Aboriginal ancestry.4 
As Sowell (2004) notes, “re-designations of individuals and groups take preferential policies 
further away from the initial rationales on which they were based. The painful history and continuing 
oppression of untouchables in India can hardly justify preferential benefits to local majorities in 
particular states such as Assam, Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh.” The big danger with AA policies is 
that they can easily deviate from their original justification, which is to correct historical wrongs, to 
embrace a “sons of the soil” argument which allows local majorities to claim jobs which should have 
gone to those who had genuinely suffered. 
The fourth feature of AA policies is the attempt to expand affirmative action to embrace groups 
which, in the original formulation of these policies, were excluded from its purview. The argument put 
forward is that the original formulation of AA policies was too exiguous in identifying groups that had a 
history of oppression and hardship and, therefore, they should be expanded to include groups that were 
wrongly excluded the first time round. The situation of the OBCs in India is a case in point: AA policies 
which were originally restricted to the SCs and STs were now extended to include members of the OBC.  
As the Mandal Commission which recommended this extension pointed out:  
“It may appear the upliftment of Other Backward Classes is part of the larger national problem 
of the removal of mass poverty. This is only partially correct. The deprivation of OBCs is a very 
special case of the larger national issue: here the basic question is that of social and educational 
backwardness and poverty is only a direct consequence of these two crippling caste-based 
handicaps. As these handicaps are embedded in our social structure, their removal will require 
                                                          
4
 So much so that there was a 42 per cent increase in the size of the Aboriginal population in Australia between the 
1981 and 1986 Censuses (Sowell, 2004).  
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far-reaching structural changes. No less important will be changes in the perception of the 
problems of OBCs by the ruling classes of the country.”5  
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